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Abstract
We develop a small open economy macroeconomic model where ﬁnancial conditions
inﬂuence aggregate behavior. We use this model to explore the connection between
t h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n dﬁnancial distress. We show that ﬁxed exchange rates
exacerbate ﬁnancial crises by tieing the hands of the monetary authorities. We then
investigate the quantitative signiﬁcance by ﬁrst calibrating the model to Korean data
and then showing that it does a reasonably good job of matching the Korean experi-
ence during its recent ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, the model accounts well for the
sharp increase in lending rates and the large drop in output, investment and produc-
tivity during the 1997-1998 episode. We then perform some counterfactual exercises to
illustrate the quantitative signiﬁcance of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating rates both for macroeco-
nomic performance and for welfare. Overall, these exercises imply that welfare losses
following a ﬁnancial crisis are signiﬁcantly larger under ﬁxed exchange rates relative
to ﬂexible exchange rates.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E5, F3, F4
Keywords: Financial crises, exchange rate policy
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cycle"1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years there has been a dramatic rise in the frequency of ﬁnancial crises
that have led to signiﬁcant contractions in economic activity. One feature of these crises,
that pertains in particular to open economies, is the strong connection with a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime. In a study covering the 1970s through the 1990s, Kaminsky and Reinhart
[28] document the strong correlation between domestic ﬁnancial strains and currency crises.
Put diﬀerently, countries in the position of having to defend an exchange rate peg were
more likely to have suﬀered severe ﬁnancial distress. The likely reason is straightforward:
defending an exchange rate peg generally requires the central bank to adjust interest rates in
a direction that reinforces the crisis. Moreover, this connection between external constraints
on monetary policy and ﬁnancial crises is not simply a post-war phenomenon: during the
Great Depression, as Eichengreen [23] and others have shown, countries that stayed on the
gold standard suﬀered far more severe ﬁnancial and economic distress than countries that
left early.
In this paper we develop a small open economy macroeconomic model where ﬁnancial
conditions inﬂuence aggregate behavior. Our goal is to explore the connection between the
exchange rate regime and ﬁnancial distress. Speciﬁcally, we extend to the open economy the
ﬁnancial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [7] (hereafter
BGG), that is in turn based on earlier work by Bernanke and Gertler [6], Kiyotaki and Moore
[29], Carlstrom and Fuerst [13] and others. We then consider how the choice of the exchange
rate regime inﬂuences an economy’s response to a ﬁnancial crisis.
To judge the empirical relevance of our framework, we conduct a quantitative exercise
aimed at replicating the key features of the Korean experience during the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis of 1997-98. We focus on the Korean episode because it is symptomatic of many ﬁnancial
crises that have occurred over time: the country experienced a sharp contraction in both
output and measured productivity, along with a sharp deterioration in credit conditions,
including falling asset prices and increasing credit spreads. As well, in the process the
country’s central bank was attempting to defend a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Our quantitative model is able to account for the roughly fourteen percent drop in
Korean output during the 1997-98 crisis, as well as most of the other salient features of this
episode. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is key: we show that it accounts for nearly
half of the decline in economic activity. We also perform some counterfactual exercises to
1illustrate how being tied to the ﬁxed exchange rate regime may have exacerbated the crisis.
Because our model is optimization-based, we are able to compute the explicit welfare costs
of the crisis and explore the welfare consequences of pursuing alternative policies.
Several papers have recently emphasized that sharp declines in measured productivity
are a robust characteristic of ﬁnancial crises, raising the possibility that productivity shocks
(broadly deﬁned) may be the true underlying causal force (e.g., Cole and Ohanian [20] and
C h a r i ,K e h o ea n dM c G r a t t a n[ 1 6 ] ) .W ed e m o n s t r a t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et oe x p l a i n
most of the variation in measured productivity during the Korean crisis by appealing to
endogenous utilization of capital. Speciﬁcally, within our model, the investment and output
collapse brought about by the ﬁnancial crisis induces a drop in capital utilization, leading to
a decline in measured productivity. Of course, in this case the drop in productivity reﬂects
mismeasurement of capital input utilization and not a true shift in productivity. To support
this modelling approach, we present evidence that electricity utilization (a conventional proxy
for capital utilization) fell sharply in tandem with measured productivity.
Finally, we note that there is now a lengthy literature containing theoretical models of
ﬁnancial crises in emerging market economies. Our paper is in the spirit of a large subset
of this literature that emphasizes how balance sheets on borrower spending (arising from
credit market frictions) give rise to a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism that works to propa-
gate ﬁnancial crises. Some prominent examples include: Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee
[2], Cespedes, Chang and Velasco [14] (hereafter CCV), Caballero and Krisnamurthy [11],
Christiano, Gust and Roldos [17], Devereux and Lane [22], and Schneider and Tornell [38].
Our paper is probably closest to CCV, who similarly emphasize the role of the exchange
rate policy. The analysis in virtually all of this literature, however, is focused on qualitative
results. In contrast, we develop a quantitative model and then explore how well the model
can account for an actual crisis experience.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Korean experience
and presents evidence on a set of key macroeconomic variables. Section 3 introduces the
model. Section 4 ﬁrst presents some policy experiments to illustrate the interaction between
the ﬁnancial accelerator and the exchange rate regime. It then presents an exercise to assess
how well the model can capture the Korean experience, along with several counterfactual
policy experiments. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2002) also perform a quantitative analysis, though they focus on explaining
the implications for monetary transmission in a crisis, as opposed to matching model performance against
an actual crisis experience.
22 The Korean Financial Crisis
The Korean ﬁnancial crisis began in October of 1997, following crises in Thailand and other
Asian countries that had unfolded few months earlier. Even though it was not the ﬁrst in
a chain, the Korean crisis was largely unanticipated, according to Krueger and Yoo [31].
Although Korean banks were heavily exposed to risk in emerging market economies, this
was not widely appreciated until October 1997 when Standard & Poors downgraded the
country’s sovereign risk status.3 Massive capital ﬂight along with a sharp rise in the country
risk premium followed. Dwindling foreign currency reserves then forced the central bank to
raise the overnight call rate over a thousand basis points. The sharp rise in the country risk
premium and short-term interest rates was the prelude to a substantial deterioration of real
economic activity.
Figure 1 plots the real-side behavior of the Korean economy during this time period.
Real GDP had been consistently above trend for several years before the crisis and showed
no weakness until the fourth quarter of 1997. During the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, real GDP fell
eight percent and subsequently contracted by another six percent. Investment played a key
role in the overall decline. Real gross capital formation had been gradually weakening since
the beginning of 1997 and then experienced a forty percent contraction in the ﬁrst quarter of
1998, before falling another ten percent in the subsequent two quarters. Real consumption
spending tracked GDP during the downturn, falling by fourteen percent in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1998 and eighteen percent overall during the crisis period. Employment fell by somewhat
less than GDP — eight percent from peak to trough, implying a six percent reduction in
labor productivity, as measured by GDP per worker. The drop in labor productivity is
associated with a sharp reduction in capital utilization over this time period, using electricity
consumption as a proxy for capital services.4
Figure 2 plots the behavior of various ﬁnancial variables. As we noted earlier, the
country borrowing premium, as measured by the EMBI Global spread, rose ﬁve hundred
basis points (from one hundred to six hundred) in a two-month period following the onset
3In particular, Korean oﬀ-shore banks held substantial quantities of dollar-denominated foreign loans
from countries such as Indonesia and Russia.
4If energy and capital services enter the production function as perfect complements owing to a Leontief
technology, then electricity is a perfect measure for capital utilization. Econometric estimates imply a very
low degree of substitutability between capital and energy especially in the short-run, making electricity a
very good proxy even in the absence of perfect complementarity.
3of the crisis in October 1997.5 The central bank’s attempt to defend the exchange rate led
to an increase in the overnight call rate of twelve hundred basis points in the ﬁnal quarter of
1997. Associated with the sharp increase in the country risk premium and the call rate was
a substantial rise in credit spreads, together with a substantial decline in asset prices. The
corporate-treasury bond spread rose nine percentage points. The stock market, which had
been trending downward prior to the crisis, lost two hundred points, or a third of its value,
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Following a brief rally, stock prices lost another
hundred points before beginning a recovery in the second quarter of 1998.
Once the central bank abandoned the peg in favor of a ﬂexible exchange rate, interest
rates were gradually reduced in 1998. It is reasonable to believe that prior expectations
regarding the probability that Korea would abandon the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t ew e r el o w . 6
Once it was clear that the Bank of Korea failed in its attempt to defend the won, however,
the currency depreciated by almost ﬁfty percent. Inﬂation, which was averaging four percent
before the crisis, increased ﬁve percentage points in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 as import prices
rose sharply following the devaluation. The overall reduction in economic activity led to a
sharp contraction in inﬂation however. By the ﬁrst quarter of 1999, inﬂation had fallen to
half percent, well below its pre-crisis level.
Figure 3 plots the foreign sector of the Korean economy. The forty percent decline in the
real exchange rate led to a ﬁfteen percent increase in the ratio of net exports to GDP. Nearly
all of this increase in net exports is attributable to the forty percent decline in imports rather
than an expansion in exports however. Thus it appears that the competitiveness eﬀect of
the devaluation had, at best, only a modest expansionary eﬀect on the economy.7
In sum, the initial stages of the Korean crisis were associated with an unanticipated large
outﬂow of capital and a simultaneous increase in the country borrowing premium. Short-
term interest rates rose rapidly because the central bank was attempting to defend a ﬁxed
exchange rate. In the months that followed, both ﬁnancial and real conditions deteriorated
sharply. Eventually the economy recovered, though only after the central bank had clearly
5The country risk spread also rose sharply following the Russian crisis. This had very little eﬀect on the
Korean economy however. By this time, the Korean monetary authority had abandoned the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime.
6Even though Thailand, after a strong speculative attack, let the currency ﬂoat on July 2, 1997, the
EMBI Global for Korea climbed above hundred basis points only on October 9, 1997.
7This reﬂects, in part, the fact that many of Korea’s Asian trading partners were also suﬀering from the
crisis environment. It also reﬂects the fact that the Korean economy was unable to grow its way out of the
recession by exporting more goods to economically stable trading partners such as the U.S and Europe.
4abandoned the peg. We next proceed to develop a quantitative model designed to capture
these phenomena.
3 The Model
The core framework is a small open economy model with money and nominal price rigidities,
along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [35], Svensson [39], Gali and Monacelli [26], Chari,
K e h o ea n dM c G r a t t a n[ 1 5 ] ,a n do t h e r s .T h ek e ym o d i ﬁcation is the inclusion of a ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism, as developed in BGG. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism links the
condition of borrower balance sheets to the terms of credit, and hence to the demand for
capital. Via the impact on borrower balance sheets, the ﬁnancial accelerator magniﬁes the
eﬀects of shocks to the economy. As in Kiyotaki and Moore [29] and BGG, unanticipated
movements in asset prices provide the main source of variation in borrower balance sheets.
As in BGG, a countercyclical monetary policy can potentially mitigate a ﬁnancial crisis:
easing of rates during a contraction, for example, helps stabilize asset price movements and
hence borrower balance sheets. External constraints on monetary policy, instead, limit this
stabilizing option.
Within the model there exist both households and ﬁrms. There is also a foreign sector
and a government sector. Households work, save, and consume tradable goods that are pro-
duced both at home (H) and abroad (F). Domestically and foreign-made goods are imperfect
substitutes.
Within the home country, there are three types of producers: (i) entrepreneurs; (ii)
capital producers; and (iii) retailers. Entrepreneurs manage the production of wholesale
goods. They borrow from households to ﬁnance the acquisition of capital used in the pro-
duction process. Due to imperfections in the capital market, entrepreneurs’ demand for
capital depends on their respective ﬁnancial positions - this is the key aspect of the ﬁnancial
accelerator. In turn, in response to entrepreneurial demand, capital producers build new
capital. Finally, retailers package together wholesale goods to produce ﬁnal output. They
are monopolistically competitive and set nominal prices on a staggered basis. The role of
the retail sector in our model is simply to provide the source of nominal price stickiness.
We now proceed to describe the behavior of the diﬀerent sectors of the economy, along
with the key resource constraints.
53.1 Households
3.1.1 Consumption Composites
Let Ct be a composite of tradable consumption goods. Then the following CES index deﬁnes
household preferences over home consumption, CH
t , and foreign consumption, CF
t :
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The domestic consumption good, CH
t ,i sac o m p o s i t eo fd i ﬀerentiated products sold by
domestic monopolistically competitive retailers. However, since we can describe household
behavior in terms of the composite good CH
t , we defer discussion of the retail sector until
section (3.3.3) below.
3.1.2 The Household’s Decision Problem
Let Ht denote household labor and Mt/Pt denote real money balances. Household preferences
are given by
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and with σ ≥ 0, ς ∈ (0,1), and ξ > 0.
Let Wt denote the nominal wage; Πt real dividend payments (from ownership of retail
ﬁrms); Tt lump sum real tax payments; St the nominal exchange rate; Bt+1 and B∗
t+1 nominal
bonds denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively; and (1 + it) and (1 + i∗
t)
the domestic and foreign gross nominal interest rate, respectively. In addition, Ψt represents
a gross borrowing premium that domestic residents must pay to obtain funds from abroad.
The household’s budget constraint is then given by
Ct =
Wt
Pt
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Pt
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6where Ψt, the country borrowing premium, depends on total net foreign indebtedness, NFt,
and a random shock, Φt, as follows: Ψt = f(NFt)Φt,w i t hf0(·) > 0. We introduce this
country borrowing premium partly for technical reasons. Without it, net foreign indebted-
ness may be non-stationary, complicating the analysis of local dynamics. Thus, following
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [37] we introduce a small friction in the world capital market. We
set the elasticity of Ψt with respect to NFt very close to zero, so that this distortion does
not alter the high frequency model dynamics but nonetheless makes NFt revert to trend.
A second important reason for introducing the country borrowing premium Ψt is that it is
a simple way to model sudden capital outﬂows of the type that appeared to initiate the
Korean crisis, as described in the previous section. In particular, we represent a sudden
capital outﬂow as a positive blip in the random variable Φt, which in turn directly raises Ψt.
The household maximizes (3) subject to (4) and (5).
3.1.3 Consumption Allocation, Labor Supply, and Saving
The optimality conditions for the consumption allocation, labor supply, and the consump-
tion/saving decision are reasonably conventional:
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where λt, the marginal utility of the consumption index, is given by
λt =( 1− ς)(Ct)
(σ−1)(ς−1)−1 (1 − Ht)
ς(1−σ) (9)
and (1 + it) Pt
Pt+1 denotes the gross real interest rate. In addition, the optimality condition
governing the choice of foreign bonds in conjunction with equation (8) yields the following
uncovered interest parity condition:
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7The household also decides money holdings. However, we do not report this relation
in the model. Because we restrict attention to monetary regimes where either the nominal
exchange rate or the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, money demand plays no
role other than to pin down the nominal money stock (see, e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler
[18]).
3.2 Foreign Behavior
In considering arbitrage in goods markets, we distinguish between the wholesale (import)
price of foreign goods and the retail price in the domestic market by allowing for imperfect
competition and pricing-to-market in the local economy (see section 3.3.3). At the wholesale
level, the law of one price holds. Let PF
W,t denote the wholesale price of foreign goods in
domestic currency, and PF∗
t the foreign currency price of such goods. The law of one price
then implies:
P
F
W,t = StP
F∗
t . (11)
We take as exogenous both the gross foreign nominal interest rate (1 + i∗
t) and the nominal
price (in units of foreign currency) of the foreign tradable good, PF∗
t . Finally, we assume
that foreign demand for the home tradable good, CH∗
t ,i sg i v e nb y
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where Y ∗
t is real foreign output, which we take as given. The term
¡
CH∗
t−1
¢1−ν represents inertia
in foreign demand for domestic products. Because the home economy is small (in the sense
that it cannot aﬀect foreign output, the foreign price level, or the foreign interest rate), it is
sensible to simply postulate an empirically reasonable reduced-form export demand curve.
In addition, we assume balanced trade in the steady state and normalize the steady
terms of trade at unity.
3.3 Firms
We consider in turn: entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retailers.
3.3.1 Entrepreneurs, Finance, and Wholesale Production
Entrepreneurs manage production and obtain ﬁnancing for the capital employed in the pro-
duction process. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. To ensure that they never accumulate
8enough funds to fully self-ﬁnance their capital acquisitions, we assume they have a ﬁnite
expected horizon. Each survives until the next period with probability φ. Accordingly, the
expected horizon is 1
1−φ. The entrepreneurs’ population is stationary, with new entrepre-
neurs entering to replace those who exit. To ensure that new entrepreneurs have some funds
available when starting out, we follow BGG by endowing each entrepreneur with He
t units
of labor which is supplied inelastically as a managerial input to production. Entrepreneurs
receive a small wage in compensation.
The entrepreneur starts any period t with capital,K t, acquired in the previous period
(shortly we describe the capital acquisition decision.) He then produces domestic output,
Yt,u s i n gl a b o r ,Lt, and capital services, utKt, where ut is the capital utilization rate. (For
notational simplicity we omit entrepreneur-speciﬁc indices.) The labor input Lt is assumed
to be a composite of household and managerial labor: Lt = HΩ
t H
e(1−Ω)
t . We normalize He
t to
unity. The entrepreneur’s gross project output, GYt, consists of the sum of his production
revenues and the market value of his remaining capital stock. In addition, we assume his
project is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ωt,t h a ta ﬀects both the production of new
goods and the eﬀective quantity of his capital. The shock ωt may be considered a measure
of the quality of his overall capital investment.
Let PW,t be the nominal price of wholesale output, Qt the real market price of capital,8
PI,t the nominal replacement price of capital (see section 3.3.2), δt the depreciation rate,
and At a common productivity factor. Then, by deﬁnition, GYt, equals the sum of output
revenues,
PW,t
Pt Yt, and the market value of the capital stock, QtωtKt, net of the cost of repairing
the worn out equipment,
PI,t
Pt δtωtKt:
GYt ≡
PW,t
Pt
Yt +( Qt −
PI,t
Pt
δt)ωtKt (13)
where wholesale good production, Yt,i sg i v e nb y
Yt = ωtAt(utKt)
αL
1−α
t . (14)
Note that the entrepreneur has the option of either selling his end-of-period capital on the
market or keeping it for use in the subsequent period. Finally, we assume that ωt is an i.i.d
random variable, distributed continuously with mean equal to one, i.e. E{ωt} =1 .
8Qt is in units of the household consumption index (1).
9Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman [27], we endogenize the utilization deci-
sion by assuming that the capital depreciation rate is increasing in ut.A s i n B a x t e r a n d
Farr [5], depreciation is the following convex function δt (·) of the utilization rate:
δ(ut)=δ +
b
1+ξ
(ut)
1+ξ with δ,b,ξ > 0. (15)
At time t, the entrepreneur chooses labor and the capital utilization rate to maximize
proﬁts, conditional on Kt,A t and ωt. Accordingly, labor demand satisﬁes
(1 − α)Ω
Yt
Ht
=
Wt
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(1 − α)(1 − Ω)
Yt
He
t
=
We
t
PW,t
(16)
where We
t is the managerial wage. The optimality condition for capital utilization is
α
Yt
ut
= δ
0 (ut)Kt
PI,t
PW,t
. (17)
Equation (17) equates the marginal value of the output gain from a higher rate of utilization
with its marginal cost owing to a higher rate of capital depreciation.
We now consider the capital acquisition decision. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur
purchases capital which can be used in the subsequent period t +1to produce output at
that time. The entrepreneur ﬁnances the acquisition of capital partly with his own net
worth available at the end of period t, Nt+1, and partly by issuing nominal bonds, Bt+1.
Then capital ﬁnancing is divided between net worth and debt, as follows:
QtKt+1 = Nt+1 +
Bt+1
Pt
. (18)
The entrepreneur’s net worth is essentially the equity of the ﬁrm, i.e., the gross value of
capital net of debt, QtKt+1 −
Bt+1
Pt . The entrepreneur accumulates net worth through past
earnings, including capital gains. We assume that new equity issues are prohibitively ex-
pensive, so that all marginal ﬁnance is obtained through debt.9 We also assume that debt
is denominated in units of domestic currency. Later we will consider the case where debt is
issued in foreign currency units.
9To be clear, being an equity holder in this context means being privy to the ﬁrm’s private information,
as well as having a claim on the earnings stream. Thus, we are assuming that the ﬁrm cannot attract new
wealthy investors that costlessly absorb all ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
10The entrepreneur’s demand for capital depends on the expected marginal return and
the expected marginal ﬁnancing cost. The marginal return to capital (equal to the expected
average return due to constant returns) is next period’s ex-post gross output net of labor
costs, normalized by the period t market value of capital:
1+r
k
t+1 =
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Wt+1
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h
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where Y t+1 is the average level of output per entrepreneur (i.e., Yt+1 = ωtY t+1). Note
that the marginal return varies proportionately with the idiosyncractic shock ωt+1.S i n c e
Et{ωt+1} =1 , we can express the expected marginal return simply as
Et{1+r
k
t+1} =
Et{
PW,t+1
Pt+1 α
Y t+1
Kt+1 −
PI,t+1
Pt+1 δ (ut+1)+Qt+1}
Qt
. (20)
The marginal cost of funds to the entrepreneur depends on ﬁnancial conditions. We
postulate an agency problem that makes uncollateralized external ﬁnance more expensive
than internal ﬁnance. As in BGG, we assume a costly state veriﬁcation problem. The
idiosyncratic shock ωt is private information for the entrepreneur, implying that the lender
cannot freely observe the project’s gross output. To observe this return, the lender must pay
an auditing cost - interpretable as a bankruptcy cost - that is a ﬁxed proportion µb of the
project’s ex-post gross payoﬀ, (1+rk
t+1)QtKt+1. The entrepreneur and the lender negotiate a
ﬁnancial contract that: (i) induces the entrepreneur not to misrepresent his earnings; and (ii)
minimizes the expected deadweight agency costs (in this case the expected auditing costs)
associated with this ﬁnancial transaction.
We restrict attention to ﬁnancial contracts that are negotiated one period at a time
and that oﬀers lenders a payoﬀ that is independent of aggregate risk. As we show in the
appendix, under these assumptions it is straightforward to show that the optimal contract
takes a very simple and realistic form: standard debt with costly bankruptcy. If the entre-
preneur does not default, the lender receives a ﬂat payment. If the entrepreneur defaults,
the lender audits and seizes whatever it ﬁnds. It is true that we are arbitrarily ruling out the
possibility of enterpreneurs obtaining insurance against aggregate risks to their net worth.
However, some experiments that we do not report here suggest that the households in our
11framework are too risk averse to be willing to provide this insurance, at least given our model
parametrization.10 In general, though, we simply appeal to realism and features outside the
model (e.g. diﬃculties in enforcing wealth transfers in bad times) to rule out aggregate
state-contingent wealth insurance.11
Overall, the agency problem implies that the opportunity cost of external ﬁnance is
more expensive than that of internal ﬁnance. Because the lender must receive a competitive
return, it charges the borrower a premium to cover the expected bankruptcy costs. Because
the external ﬁnance premium aﬀects the overall cost of ﬁnance, it therefore inﬂuences the
entrepreneur’s demand for capital.
In general, the external ﬁnance premium varies inversely with the entreprenuer’s net
worth: the greater the share of capital that the entrepreneur can either self-ﬁnance or ﬁnance
with collateralized debt, the smaller the expected bankruptcy costs and, hence, the smaller
the external ﬁnance premium. Rather than present the details of the agency problem here, we
simply observe, following BGG, that the external ﬁnance premium, χt (·), may be expressed
as an increasing function of the leverage ratio,
Bt+1
Pt
Nt+1:
χt (·)=χ
Ã
Bt+1
Pt
Nt+1
!
(21)
χ
0(·) > 0, χ(0) = 0, χ(∞)=∞.
The speciﬁcf o r mo fχt (·) depends on the primitive parameters of the costly state veriﬁ-
cation problem, including the proportional bankruptcy cost µb and the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock ωt (see the appendix for details.) In addition, note that χt (·) depends
only on the aggregate leverage ratio and not on any entrepreneur-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s . T h i s
10Speciﬁcally, in the model experiments we consider below, we compared the percent variation in the
shadow value of a unit of wealth for entrepreneurs versus households. For entrepreneurs, this shadow
value corresponds to the discounted value of the change in proﬁts that stem from having another unit of
wealth. It varies countercyclically because credit constraints vary countercyclically. For households, this
shadow value corresponds to the marginal utility of consumption. Each household’s shadow value also
varies countercyclically since consumption is procyclical. Our computational experiments suggested that,
for the ﬁnancial crisis we simulate below, the percent increase in household’s marginal utility of consumption
exceeded the percent rise in the entrepreneurs’ shadow value of wealth. These results suggest that, at least
for the parametrizations used here, households would not be willing to insure enterpreneurs against the kind
aggregate risks that lead to crises.
11Krishnamurthy [30], for example, motivates incomplete wealth insurance against aggregate risk by ap-
pealing to credibility problems on the part of the supplier.
12simpliﬁcation arises because, in equilibrium, all entrepreneurs choose the same leverage ra-
tio, which owes to having constant returns in both production and bankruptcy costs due to
risk neutrality (see, e,g. Carlstrom and Fuerst [13] and BGG.)
By deﬁnition, the entrepreneur’s overall marginal cost of funds in this environment is the
product of the gross premium for external funds and the gross real opportunity cost of funds
that would arise in the absence of capital market frictions. Accordingly, the entrepreneur’s
demand for capital satisﬁes the optimality condition
Et
©
1+r
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ª
=( 1+χt (·))Et
½
(1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
¾
(22)
where Et{(1 + it) Pt
Pt+1} is the gross cost of funds absent capital market frictions.
Equation (22) is interpretable as follows: at the margin, the entrepreneur considers
acquiring a unit of capital ﬁnanced by debt. The additional debt, however, raises the leverage
ratio, increasing the external ﬁnance premium and the overall marginal cost of ﬁnance.
Relative to perfect capital markets, accordingly, the demand for capital is lower, the exact
amount depending on χt (·).12
Equation (22) provides the basis for the ﬁnancial accelerator. It links movements in
the borrower ﬁnancial position to the marginal cost of funds and, hence, to the demand for
capital. Note, in particular, that ﬂuctuations in the price of capital, Qt,m a yh a v es i g n i ﬁcant
eﬀects on the leverage ratio,
Bt+1
Pt
Nt+1 =
Bt+1
Pt
QtKt+1−
Bt+1
Pt
. In this way, the model captures the link
between asset price movements and collaterals stressed in the Kiyotaki and Moore [29] theory
of credit cycles.
The other key component of the ﬁnancial accelerator is the relation that describes the
evolution of entrepreneurial net worth, Nt+1. Let Vt denote the value of entrepreneurial ﬁrm
capital net of borrowing costs carried over from the previous period. This value is given by
Vt =
¡
1+r
k
t
¢
Qt−1Kt −
·
(1 + χ(·))(1 + it−1)
Pt−1
Pt
¸
Bt
Pt−1
. (23)
In this expression, (1+rk
t) is the ex-post real return on capital, and (1+χ(·))(1+it−1)
Pt−1
Pt
is the ex-post cost of borrowing. Net worth may then be expressed as a function of Vt and
the managerial wage, We
t /Pt,
12While we use the costly state veriﬁcation problem to derive a parametric form for χt(·), we note, however,
that the general form relating external ﬁnance costs to ﬁnancial positions arises across a broad class of agency
problems.
13Nt+1 = φVt + W
e
t /Pt (24)
where the weight φ reﬂects the number of entrepreneurs who survive each period.13
As equations (23) and (24) suggest, the principle source of movements in net worth stems
from unanticipated movements in returns and borrowing costs. In this regard, unforecastable
variations in the asset price Qt likely provide the principle source of ﬂuctuations in (1+rk
t).
It is for this reason that unpredictable asset price movements play a key role in the ﬁnancial
accelerator. On the liability side, unexpected movements in the price level aﬀect ex post
borrowing costs. An unexpected deﬂation, for example, reduces entrepreneurial net worth.
If debt were instead denominated in foreign currency, then unexpected movements in the
nominal exchange rate would similarly shift net worth - we explore this possibility later.
Entrepreneurs going out of business at time t consume their remaining resources. Let Ce
t
denote the amount of the consumption composite consumed by the exiting entrepreneurs.14
Then
C
e
t =( 1− φ)Vt (25)
is the total amount of equity that exiting entrepreneurs remove from the market.
3.3.2 Capital Producers
Competitive capital producers engage in two separate activities: the repair of depreciated
capital and the construction of new capital goods. Both of these activities take place after
production of output at time t. Following Eisner and Strotz [24] and Lucas [32], we assume
that the construction of new capital goods is subject to adjustment costs whereas the repair
of old capital goods is not. We further assume that there is no scope for substitution between
repair of old capital and construction of new capital — that is, in order for old capital to be
productive it must be repaired.
Both activities, repair and construction, use as input an investment good that is com-
posed of domestic and foreign ﬁnal goods:
It =
h
(γi)
1
ρi (I
H
t )
ρi−1
ρi +( 1− γi)
1
ρi(I
F
t )
ρi−1
ρi
i ρi
ρi−1 . (26)
13In our quantitative exercises, We
t is of negligible size, and the dynamics of Nt is determined by Vt.
14We assume that entrepreneurs have preferences over domestic and foreign goods that are identical to the
households’ preferences speciﬁed in equation (1). The optimal mix of foreign and domestic tradable goods
for entrepreneurial consumption satisﬁes an equation analogous to (6).
14The production parameter γi measures the relative weight that domestic and foreign inputs
receive in the investment composite. Capital producers choose the optimal mix of foreign
and domestic inputs according to the intra-temporal ﬁrst-order-condition
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with the investment price index, PI,t,g i v e nb y
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To repair depreciated capital, producers require δ(ut)Kt units of the investment good
which may be purchased at a cost of
PI,t
Pt δtKt. Consistent with equation (13), these costs are
borne by the entrepreneurs who own the capital stock.
To construct new capital, producers use both investment goods and existing capital,
which they lease from entrepreneurs. Let In
t denote net investment — the amount of the
investment good used for the construction of new capital goods
I
n
t = It − δ(ut)Kt. (29)
Each capital producer operates a constant returns to scale technology Φ(
In
t
Kt)Kt. Consistent
with the notion of adjustment costs for net investment, Φ(·) is increasing and concave. Under
constant returns to scale, the resulting economy-wide capital accumulation equation is
Kt+1 = Kt + Φ(
In
t
Kt
)Kt. (30)
Individual capital producers choose inputs In
t and Kt to maximize expected proﬁts from
the construction of new investment goods. New capital goods are sold at a price Qt.W e
assume, following BGG, that capital producers make their plans to produce new capital one
period in advance. The idea is to capture the delayed response of investment observed in
the data. The optimality condition for net investment satisﬁes
Et−1
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QtΦ
0
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− δ(ut)
¶
−
PI,t
Pt
¾
=0 . (31)
Equation (31) is a standard “Q-investment” relation, modiﬁed to allow for the investment
delay15. The variable price of capital, though, plays an additional role in this framework: as
we have discussed, variations in asset prices will aﬀect entrepreneurial balance sheets, and
hence, the cost of capital.
15The second input into production, Kt, is required to preserve constant returns to scale. Let rl
t denote
153.3.3 Retailers, Price Setting, and Inﬂation
We assume there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure unity.
Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs/producers in a competitive manner and
then diﬀerentiate the product slightly (e.g., by painting it or adding a brand name) at a
ﬁxed resource cost κ. We assume that the ﬁxed (from the retailers’ point of view) resource
cost represents distribution and selling costs that are assumed to be proportional to the
steady-state value of wholesale output. We choose the level of the ﬁxed costs so that proﬁts
to the retail sector are zero in steady-state.16
Let Y H
t (z) be the good sold by retailer z. Final domestic output is a CES composite of
individual retail goods:
Y
H
t =
·Z 1
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Y
H
t (z)
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ϑ dz
¸ ϑ
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− κ. (32)
The corresponding price of the composite ﬁnal domestic good, PH
t ,i sg i v e nb y
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¸ 1
1−ϑ
. (33)
Domestic households, capital producers, the government, and the foreign country buy ﬁnal
goods from retailers. Cost minimization implies that each retailer faces an isoelastic demand
for his product given by Y H
t (z)=
³
PH
t (z)
PH
t
´−ϑ
Y H
t . Since retailers simply repackage wholesale
goods, the marginal cost to the retailers of producing a unit of output is simply the relative
wholesale price,
PW,t
PH
t .
As we have noted, the retail sector provides the source of nominal stickiness in the
economy. We assume retailers set nominal prices on a staggered basis, following the approach
in Calvo [12]: each retailer resets his price with probability (1 − θ), independently of the time
elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period a measure (1 − θ) of producers reset
the lease rate for existing capital; then proﬁts equal QtΦ(
In
t
Kt)Kt −
PI,t
Pt In
t − rl
tKt. The optimality condition
for the choice of Kt determines the equilibrium lease rate rl
t:
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¶¾
= rl
t.
At the steady-state, there are no adjustments costs so that Φ(0) = Φ0(0) = 0. As a result, lease payments
rl
tKt are second-order and are negligible in terms of both steady-state and model dynamics.
16In addition to justifying zero proﬁts for the retail sector, the presence of ﬁxed costs in the production
chain increases the economy-wide beneﬁt to varying capital utilization at the margin.
16their prices, while a fraction θ keeps their prices unchanged. Accordingly, the expected time
ap r i c er e m a i n sﬁxed is 1
1−θ. Thus, for example, if θ = .75 per quarter, prices are ﬁxed on
average for a year.
Since there are no ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables, all retailers setting price at t will choose
t h es a m eo p t i m a lv a l u e ,P
H
t . It can be shown that, in the neighborhood of the steady state,
the domestic price index evolves according to
P
H
t =( P
H
t−1)
θ(P
H
t )
1−θ. (34)
Retailers free to reset choose prices to maximize expected discounted proﬁts, subject to the
constraint on the frequency of price adjustments.17 Here we simply observe that, within a
local neighborhood of the steady state, the optimal price is
P
H
t = µ
∞ Y
i=0
(PW,t+i)
(1−βθ)(βθ)i
(35)
where µ = 1
1−1/ϑ is the retailers’ desired gross mark-up over wholesale prices. Note that
if retail prices were perfectly ﬂexible, equation (35) would simply imply P
H
t = µPW,t, i.e.,
the retail price would simply be a proportional mark-up over the wholesale price. However,
because their prices may be ﬁxed for some time, retailers set prices based on the expected
future path of marginal cost, and not simply on current marginal cost.
Combining equations (34) and (35) yields an expression for the gross domestic inﬂation
rate (within the neighborhood of a zero-inﬂation steady state):
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(36)
where the parameter λ =
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ is decreasing in θ, the measure of price rigidity. Equation
(36) is the canonical form of the new optimization-based Phillips curve that arises from an
environment of time-dependent staggered price setting (see, e.g., Gali and Gertler [25]). The
curve relates inﬂation to movements in real marginal cost and expected inﬂation.
Owing to imperfect competition, foreign goods sold in the local economy are subject to
an analogous mark-up over the wholesale price. We assume that retailers of foreign goods
face the marginal cost PF
W,t - see equation (11) - and set prices according to a Calvo-style
17Since it is standard in the literature, we do not report the maximization problem here.
17price setting equation. Let 1 − θ
f denote the probability that a retailer of foreign goods
resets its price in any given period. The inﬂation rate for foreign goods then satisﬁes
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t
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(37)
where λf =
(1−θf)(1−βθf)
θf .. This speciﬁcation of the pricing process for domestically-sold
foreign goods implies temporary deviations from the law of one price owing to delay in the
exchange rate pass-through mechanism.18 The coeﬃcient θ
fcaptures the degree of this delay.
When calibrating the model, we assume that retailers of domestic and foreign goods face the
same degree of price rigidity, so that θ
f = θ.19
CPI inﬂation is a composite of domestic and foreign good price inﬂation. Within a local
region of the steady state, CPI inﬂation may be expressed as
Pt
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3.4 Resource Constraints
The resource constraint for the domestic tradable good sector is
Y
H
t = C
H
t + C
eH
t + C
H∗
t + I
H
t + G
H
t (39)
where GH
t is government consumption and CeH
t is entrepreneurial consumption of the do-
mestic good.
3.5 Government Budget Constraint
We assume that government expenditures are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes and money cre-
ation as follows:
PH
t
Pt
G
H
t =
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
+ Tt. (40)
Government expenditures are exogenous. Lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy the government
budget constraint. Finally, the money stock depends on monetary policy, which we will
specify in the next section.
18Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [15] also consider pricing-to-market speciﬁcations to explore the role of
nominal rigidities in explaining exchange rate dynamics.
19Since foreign prices are exogenous, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the steady-state
markup µf = µ .
18Except for the description of monetary policy, we have completed the speciﬁcation of the
model. The distinctive aspect is the ﬁnancial accelerator, characterized by just two equations:
(22) and (24). The former characterizes how net worth inﬂuences capital demand. The latter
describes the evolution of net worth. If we restrict the external ﬁnance premium χ(·) to zero
in equation (22), we eﬀectively shut oﬀ the ﬁnancial accelerator, and the model reverts to
a reasonably conventional new open economy macroeconomic framework. In what follows,
we will explore the performance of the model under alternative exchange rate regimes, with
and without an operative ﬁnancial accelerator.
3.6 Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes
In the quantitative analysis discussed in the next section, we consider shocks to the economy
under three diﬀerent scenarios: (i) a pure ﬁxed exchange rate regime; (ii) a ﬂoating exchange
rate regime, where the central bank manages the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor
rule; and (iii) a hybrid case, where the central bank initially ﬁxes the exchange rate, but then
eventually abandons the peg in favor of the ﬂoating exchange rate regime. The latter regime
is meant to approximate the monetary policy response over the crisis episode in Korea.
Under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the central bank keeps the nominal exchange rate
pegged at a predetermined level, i.e.
St = S, ∀t. (41)
In doing so, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate to satisfy the uncovered interest
parity condition given by equation (10).
Under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the policy instrument becomes the nominal
interest rate. The central bank adopts a feedback rule that has the nominal interest rate
adjust to deviations of CPI inﬂation and domestic output from their respective target values.
Let Y 0
t denote the output target level, which we take to be the level that would arise if prices
were perfectly ﬂexible. The feedback rule, accordingly, is given by
(1 + it)=( 1+rr
ss)
µ
Pt
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¶γπ µ
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t
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t
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(42)
with γπ > 1 and γy > 0, and where rrss is the steady state real interest rate. For simplicity,
we take the target gross inﬂation rate to be unity.20 We interpret this rule as being a form
20The results are robust to allowing for a managed ﬂoat, where the Tayor rule is appended with a term
that allows for a modest adjustment of the nominal interest rate to deviations of the nominal exchange rate
from target.
19of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, in the sense of Bernanke et al. [8]. The central bank adjusts
the interest rate to ensure that over time the economy meets the inﬂation target, but with
ﬂexibility in the short term so as to meet stabilization objectives. Importantly, we assume
that the central bank is able to credibly commit to the Taylor rule.
In the hybrid regime, as a shock hits the economy, the central bank initially maintains
the exchange rate peg. Conditional on being on the peg in the current period, it abandons
the peg with probability Π in the subsequent period, where Π is independent of time. Once
oﬀ the peg, the central bank reverts to the interest rate feedback rule given by equation (42).
3.7 Model Parametrization
Our quantitative analysis is meant to capture the broad features of an emerging market
economy such as South Korea for which ﬁnancial frictions seem particularly relevant. We
ﬁrst discuss the choice of the parameters governing preferences and technology, and then
describe the choice of the parameters pertinent to the ﬁnancial structure.
3.7.1 Preferences
We ﬁx the quarterly discount factor β at 0.99. We set the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution, 1
σ,e q u a lt o0.2, consistent with the evidence of low sensitivity of expected
consumption growth to real interest rates. Since consumption goods are thought to have
a higher degree of substitution than intermediate or investment goods,21 we set the intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution for the consumption composite, ρh, at unity and the intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution for the investment composite, ρi,a t0.25.T om a t c ht h e
average ratio of consumption to GDP in Korea over the period 1990-2002 - approximately
0.5 - we set the share of domestic goods in the consumption composite, γ,e q u a lt o0.5.
Finally, we assume that the elasticity of labor supply is equal to 2 and that average hours
worked relative to total hours available are equal to 1
3.
With regard to the parameters of the export demand, equation (12), we set the elasticity
κ equal to 1 and the share parameter, ν, equal to 0.25. This implies a relatively high degree
of inertia in export demand, in line with the response of Korean exports during the 1997-98
crisis.
21Around ﬁfty percent of Korean imports are intermediate goods.
203.7.2 Technology
Over the period 1990-2002, the average gross capital formation-to-GDP and exports-to-GDP
ratios in Korea were approximately 0.3 and 0.4, respectively. To match these characteristics,
we set the capital share, α,e q u a lt o0.5, the share of domestic goods in the investment
composite, γi,e q u a lt o0.5, and the steady state ratio of exports to domestic output equal
to 0.4.W e s e t Ω =0 .01, implying that entrepreneurial labor accounts for 1% of the total
wage bill. The steady state utilization rate is normalized at 1 and the steady state quarterly
depreciation, δ(uss), is assigned the conventional value of 0.025, consistent with the evidence.
The parameter ξ, which represents the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to
the utilization rate,
uδ00(u)
δ0(u) , is set equal to 1, consistent with Baxter and Farr [5], who rely on
estimates provided by Basu and Kimball [3]. The steady state mark-up value, µ, is set at
1.2. Consistent with the retail sector earning zero proﬁts in steady state, the ﬁxed resource
cost κ is assumed to be 20 percent of wholesale output. The elasticity of the price of capital
with respect to the investment-capital ratio is taken to be 2.A si sc o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e
on the Calvo [12] pricing technology, we assume the probability of the price not adjusting,
θ,t ob e0.75.
3.7.3 External Finance Premium
The data suggest that capital markets in Korea are somewhat less developed relative to the
U.S.. Debt-equity ratios were particularly high at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis.22 Early
in 1998, the Korean authorities urged the thirty largest chaebols to reduce their debt-equity
ratios to ”below 2” by the end of 1999. Conservatively, we set the steady state leverage ratio
equal to 1.1, approximately twice the historical U.S. average.
The spread between corporate and government bond rates appears to be consistently
zero prior to 1997 (see Figure 2). We interpret this as evidence of some sort of explicit/implicit
government guarantees to the Korean corporate sector. After reaching nine percent in De-
cember 1997-January 1998, the spread dropped and stabilized at around 1-2 percent in the
late spring of 1998. Since there is still some evidence of government meddling in capital
markets in Korea, we set the steady state external ﬁnance premium at 3.5 percent, roughly
150 basis points higher than U.S. historical data.
22According to Krueger and Yoo [31], in 1997 the debt-equity ratio was 5.2 for the thirty largest chaebols,
4.8 for the ﬁve largest chaebols, 4.6 for the ﬁve largest manufacturing ﬁrms, and 3.9 for all ﬁrms in the
manufacturing sector
21To obtain these steady state values, we need to set the non-standard parameters of the
model that aﬀect the relation between real and ﬁnancial variables. In particular, we set
the entrepreneurs’ death rate, (1 − φ),e q u a lt o0.0272. We assume that the idiosyncratic
productivity variable ωt is log-normally distributed with variance equal to 0.28. Finally, we
ﬁx the fraction of realized payoﬀs lost in bankruptcy, µb,t o0.12.
3.7.4 Government Policy
W es e tt h eT a y l o rr u l ec o e ﬃcients on CPI inﬂation and domestic output gap, γπ and γy
respectively, equal to 2 and 0.75, respectively. These coeﬃcients provide a reasonable ap-
proximation of the response of the real interest rate in Korea after the abandonment of the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Finally, we take the steady state government expenditure ratio,
GH
Y H,t ob e0.2.
4 External Shocks and Financial Crises: a Quantitative
Assessment
In this section we evaluate how well the model is able to replicate a ﬁnancial crisis, such
as the one that occurred in Korea. In particular, we consider the response of the model
economy to an exogenous rise in the country risk premium, meant to reﬂect the sudden
and unanticipated capital outﬂows that appear to have triggered the events that followed
the Korean crisis, as we discussed in section 2. We begin with some simple exercises meant
to illustrate the model dynamics and the sensitivity of these dynamics to the exchange rate
regime. We then turn to an experiment meant to replicate the Korean crisis episode. Finally,
for Korea, only about twenty-ﬁve percent of debt was in units of foreign currency.23 For this
reason, in our baseline exercises we assumed that debt was in domestic currency units. We
conclude this section, however, by considering the implications of having debt denominated
entirely in units of foreign currency.
23This refers to the share of liabilities denominated in foreign currency for commercial banks in Korea in
January/February 1998. See Krueger et al. [31] for details.
224.1 Country Borrowing Premium Shock
To illustrate the workings of the model, we consider an unanticipated one hundred basis point
increase in the country borrowing premium, Ψt .24 We assume further that the shock obeys
a ﬁrst-order auto-correlation process that persists at the rate of 0.95 per quarter. Figures
4A and 4B plot the response of twelve key variables under ﬁxed versus ﬂoating rates.
Under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the domestic nominal interest rate rises to match
the increase in the country borrowing premium. Due to nominal price rigidities, there is
a l s oas i g n i ﬁcant increase in the real interest rate which, in turn, induces a contraction in
output. The ﬁnancial accelerator magniﬁes the output drop — the rise in the real interest
rate induces a contraction in asset prices, which raises the leverage ratio and the external
ﬁnance premium. The increase in the latter further dampens investment and output.
Under a ﬂexible exchange rate, the domestic nominal interest rate is no longer tied to the
foreign interest rate, and is instead governed by the feedback rule, equation (42). The rise
in the country risk premium produces an immediate depreciation of the domestic currency,
which in turn prompts an increase in exports and a sharp rise in CPI inﬂation. The central
bank raises the nominal interest rate to ﬁght inﬂation, according to the feedback rule. This
monetary policy implies only a modest increase in the real interest rate however, and a
moderate drop in investment. Because the rise in domestic inﬂation is due to the currency
depreciation, it is short-lived. Nominal rates fall back to trend one period after the shock
while real rates fall slightly below trend. Output falls slightly on net, due to oﬀsetting eﬀects
of a reduction in investment demand and increasing exports. Overall, output is signiﬁcantly
more stable under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime.25
Figure 4A also shows the eﬀect of the contraction in output on capital utilization and
labor productivity. With either ﬁxed or ﬂexible exchange rates, the reduction in output
implies a reduction in capital utilization of almost equal magnitude. As a consequence,
labor productivity falls following a demand-driven slow-down, despite the fact that hours
24Note that, in this framework, this shock is formally equivalent to a shock to the foreign interest rate.
In addition, we have explored alternative experiments, such as shocks to foreign prices. These experiments
yield very similar conclusions with regard to the eﬀects of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rates in the presence
of the ﬁnancial accelerator.
25The monetary policy rule includes the output gap as well as inﬂation. In principal, output stability is
inﬂuenced by the combined eﬀect of targeting inﬂation and the output gap. Using an interest rate rule that
puts zero weight on the output gap produces very similar results however. With zero weight on the output
gap, the contraction in output produces less inﬂationary pressures and hence less need to raise real rates to
ﬁght inﬂation.
23are contracting. The model implies a strongly pro-cyclical movement in measured TFP —
under ﬁxed rates, measured TFP drops one and one half percent in response to a two percent
drop in utilization — despite the absence of any exogenous change in technology. Note that
the drop in measured TFP and utilization relative to output is roughly in line with data from
the Korean crisis period (where, again, utilization is measured by electricity usage.) These
results suggest that the model is capable of producing quantitatively realistic dynamics of
measured productivity, even though the underlying shock is ﬁnancial in nature, and not
technological.
The last two panels of Figure 4A show the eﬀect of the rise in the country risk premium
on consumption and net exports. With a ﬂexible exchange rate, consumption falls more than
output owing to the increased cost of imported consumer goods following the depreciation.
With ﬁxed rates, this eﬀect is muted and consumption falls by slightly less than output. As
expected, with ﬂexible rates, net exports increase, albeit by a modest amount. Net exports
also increase under ﬁxed rates, due to the contraction in import demand, stemming from the
sharp investment and output decline. Indeed, the rise in net exports is substantially larger
under ﬁxed exchange rates, despite the fact that the real exchange rate depreciates more
under the ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
Overall, these results imply a much larger drop in output, hours (not shown), and
investment under a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m et h a nu n d e raﬂexible exchange rate regime
in response to a rise in the country risk premium. That output should decline more under
ﬁxed rates in this scenario is, of course, a feature of the standard model absent a ﬁnancial
a c c e l e r a t o r .W h a tw ew i s ht os t r e s sh e r ei st h a tt h eﬁnancial accelerator greatly magniﬁes the
diﬀerence. Figure 5 makes this point directly. The ﬁgure plots the response of output and
investment across the two diﬀerent exchange rate regimes, with and without an operative
ﬁnancial accelerator. Under ﬁxed rates, the ﬁnancial accelerator doubles the contraction in
investment (lower left panel) and more than doubles the contraction in output (upper left
panel) at the trough. Under ﬂexible rates, instead, the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial accelerator is
far more modest.
4.2 The Korean Experience
We now turn to a quantitative exercise that is intended to capture the macroeconomic
consequences of the rise in the country risk premium that occurred in Korea during its
recent ﬁnancial crisis. Our goal is to analyze the quantitative response of our model under
24such a scenario and compare the model outcome with the actual Korean data. Within the
context of our model, an exogenous rise in the country borrowing premium introduces a
wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates in the uncovered interest parity condition
(see equation 10). Formally, it is equivalent to a shock to the foreign interest rate. As
discussed above, we believe that treating the rise in the country risk premium as exogenous
is a reasonable approximation of the Korean situation.26
We consider a ﬁve percentage point rise in the country risk premium, which is in line with
the rise in the EMBI Global that occurred in Korea during the ﬁnancial crisis. We assume
that the shock persists as a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with a 0.95 coeﬃcient, which is
also in line with the evidence.27 We capture the notion that Korea began the episode under a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime and then subsequently abandoned the peg as follows: we assume
that the exchange rate is initially ﬁxed when the shock hits, but that the central bank may
either bandon the regime in any subsequent period with a ﬁxed probability Π or continue the
peg with ﬁxed probability 1−Π. Because the Korean devaluation was largely unanticipated,
we set the abandonment probability at a relatively low value, 0.1. Accordingly, conditional
on being on the peg, the expected duration is 1
Π = 1
0.1 =1 0quarters. To roughly match
the Korean experience, we set the actual abandonment at two quarters after the shock28
(thus, the abandonment occurs sooner than the market would have guessed ex-ante). For
benchmark purposes, we also report how the economy would have responded under a pure
ﬁxed exchange rate regime and a pure ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
Figure 6A and 6B plot the response of twelve key variables under the policy of probabilis-
tic abandonment, along with the response under ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates. Overall,
the model with probabilistic abandonment does well at capturing the key outcomes of the
Korean experience displayed in Figures 1-3 above. In the Korean data, the drop in real GDP
26Cooper and Ejarque [21] provide a model with an endogenous collapse of the banking sector applied to
the Great Depression. Their model, however, does not provide an endogenous ampliﬁcation of the collapse
through a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism.
27Even after controlling for the sharp spike in the EMBI Global following the Russian crisis in 1998, it
appears that the increase in the Korean spread was persistently high after the 1997 Asian crisis.
28The reason why we set two quarters before the regime switch in our Korean experiment is the following.
Even though the IMF stand-by credit for Korea, approved on December 4, 1997, included a ﬂexible exchange
rate policy, monetary policy was tightened to restore and sustain calm in the markets, and to contain the
inﬂationary impact of the won depreciation. This implied a reversal of liquidity injected prior to the IMF
program and a sharp increase in money market rates - see Figure 2 - to stabilize the markets. Since rates
were reduced only gradually in 1998, we don’t characterize the end-1997/beginning-1998 period as a switch
to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting yet.
25is fourteen percent whereas the model produces roughly a thirteen percent drop.29 The re-
duction in gross capital formation for Korea is on the order of forty-ﬁve percent, again in line
with, albeit somewhat larger than, the model’s thirty-ﬁve percent response. Net exports (as
a percentage of GDP) increase by ﬁfteen percent in the data, compared with nearly fourteen
percent in the model. Notably, both the data and the model imply a large reduction in
imports, especially capital goods, which drives the expansion in net exports. In the data,
consumption falls by roughly eighteen percent, which is about double the nine percent im-
plied by the model. A good chunk of this discrepancy, though, might be explained by the
fact that data includes durables as well as non-durables, while consumption in the model
includes only non-durables.
The model also does well at capturing the productivity and utilization variables observed
in Korea over this time period. The Korean data imply a ﬁve percent drop in labor pro-
ductivity over the period December 1997 through September 1998 while the model implies
roughly a three percent drop. The magnitude of the decline in labor productivity observed
in the data is probably exagerated, however, since it is based on output per worker and not
on output per hour.30 As shown in ﬁgure 1, electricity consumption for the Korean economy
falls fourteen percent during the crisis period. In the model, capital utilization drops eleven
percent, in the same ballpark as the decline in electricity utilization.31 Overall, these results
imply that variable capital utilization provides a reasonable explanation for the contraction
in productivity that emerging market economies such as Korea experience in the wake of a
ﬁnancial crisis.
Finally, the model also does well at capturing various ﬁnancial features of the Korean
experience. The nine percentage point rise in the corporate-treasury bond spread observed
in the data is very close in magnitude to the response obtained by the model’s external
ﬁnance premium. In addition, the model does a good job of capturing the sudden reduction
29Because agents expect the monetary authority to abandon eventually, expected future inﬂation is higher
and, consequently, so is current inﬂation. As a result, both nominal and real interest rates rise by more
under the model with probabilistic abandonment than in the case of a pure ﬁxed exchange rate.
30A stylized fact for U.S. data is that, of the total drop in hours during a typical recession, roughly one
third reﬂects a drop in hours per worker. Not taking into account the hours per worker change, accord-
ingly, suggests a signiﬁcant exageration of the movement in labor productivity (based on measures that use
employment as opposed to hours).
31Given that oil is an imported good, we would expect some substitution away from energy towards other
capital goods and inputs in the case where energy and capital show some degree of substitutability. Hence
the fourteen percent drop in energy is likely to overstate the decline in capital services owing to a drop in
utilization rates.
26in the corporate-treasury bond spread following the abandonment of the peg. It also does
well at mimicing both the nominal and real interest rate movements observed in the data.
In particular, in the data, the (ex-post) real interest rate initially rises by eight percentage
points prior to the abandonment, and then falls by sixteen percentage points following the
abandonment — a result that is similar to the real rate path generated by the model.32
Consistent with this path, both the data and the model exhibit a surge in inﬂation — on the
order of ﬁve percentage points — following the abandonment.
The ﬁnancial variable that is diﬃcult to match is the actual exchange rate movement
when the monetary authority abandons the ﬁxed exchange rate regime probabilistically.
The fact that quantitative macroeconomic models have diﬃculty in matching exchange rate
movements comes as no surprise however. Our model nonetheless produces a sizable depreci-
a t i o ni nt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e—o nt h eo r d e ro ft e np e r c e n t .A si ti sw e l lk n o w n ,m o v e m e n t s
in the nominal exchange rate dramatically over-state movements in the real exchange rate
and the terms of trade.33 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a to u rm o d e ld o e sw e l la tc a p t u r i n gt h ed y n a m i c
response of net exports, we are less concerned that it does not fully account for the volatility
of the exchange rate during this time period.
Up to the point where the peg is abandoned, the contraction is as severe as if the economy
had been on a lasting peg. The abandonment, of course, frees the hand of monetary policy
and allows the economy to recover much faster than otherwise. As the ﬁgures indicate,
the crisis would have been much less severe had the economy all along been operating in a
credible ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
We now consider the welfare loss associated with the ﬁnancial crisis, as well as the loss
that might have occurred under alternative policy scenarios. In particular, we compute the
drop in household and entrepreneurial utility suﬀered during the crisis and then convert
this drop into consumption-equivalents. In doing so, we measure the crisis period to be six
32Although we don’t have data on ex-ante real interest rates, it is useful to look at the ex-post real interest
rate as a guide. The nominal interest rate rises from thirteen to twenty-ﬁv ep e r c e n to na na n n u a lb a s i si n
January 1998, before falling to ﬁve percent by September 1998. The inﬂation rate rises from ﬁve percent
in the third quarter of 1997 to nine percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 before falling to six percent by
September of 1998. Thus, the ex-post real rate is approximately eight percent in October 1998, sixteen
percent in January 1998 and zero percent in September 1998, indicating an initial eight percentage point
rise followed by a sixteen percentage point fall in the real interest rate.
33As emphasized by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo [9], in the absence of a substantial non-tradable
good sector, it is extremely diﬃcult to match movements in the nominal exchange rate. Barth and Dinmore
[4] provide further discussion of the response of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade for various
Asian countries during the ﬁnancial crisis.
27Table 1: Welfare Loss As a Percent of Steady-State Consumption
Model with Financial Accelerator
Flexible Rates 12.1%
Switching Regime 16.4%
Fixed Rates 20.5%
quarters, approximately the amount of time it took for Korea’s detrended GDP to recover
to its pre-crisis level. We then calculate the amount of steady state consumption that an
appropriately weighted average of households and entrepreneurs would be willing to forgo as a
one-time payment to avoid the present-discounted loss in utility associated with the crisis.34
We express the amount that individuals are willing to forgo as a fraction of one year’s
steady state consumption. Details of the calculations are in an accompanying appendix.
These results are reported in table 1. In the case meant to capture the Korean crisis, the
“Switching Regime,” the welfare loss of the crisis is quite substantial, sixteen percent of
one year’s consumption. Had the economy stayed on ﬁxed rates throughout, the loss would
have been considerable worse, twenty percent of steady state annual consumption. Had the
economy been on ﬂexible rates, the welfare loss would have still been considerable - twelve
percent of one year’s consumption - but, nonetheless, signiﬁcantly lower than under the other
policy regimes, especially the pure ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
4.3 Foreign-denominated Debt
A number of authors have recently stressed that if private debts are denominated in foreign
currency units - as was recently the case for many emerging market economies - a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime may in fact be more desirable than a ﬂexible exchange rate regime,
since devaluations weaken borrower balance sheets.35 As we have discussed, in the Korean
case, only about a quarter of all debts were denominated in foreign currency, which led us to
consider debt in domestic currency as the baseline case. Nonetheless, it is useful to explore
the extent to which our conclusions are robust to having foreign-indexed debt. Accordingly,
we brieﬂyc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀect of foreign-indexed debt for the response of the model to an
34The loss incorporates the current and future foregone consumption of households and entrepreneurs as
well as the gain in current and future household leisure that accompanies the crisis.
35See, for example, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee [2].
28unanticipated one hundred basis point increase in the country borrowing premium.36
Figure 6 plots the response of output and investment under three diﬀerent scenarios:
ﬂexible exchange rate with debt denominated entirely in foreign currency; ﬂexible exchange
rate with domestic-denominated debt; and ﬁxed exchange rate. As one would expect, foreign
currency debt makes the ﬂexible exchange rate regime considerably less attractive. Allowing
for foreign currency debt implies a contraction in investment that is twice as large as the
contraction obtained in the case of domestic currency debt. With foreign currency debt,
the depreciation of the exchange rate reduces entrepreneurial net worth, thus enhancing the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. Nonetheless, even in this instance, the output drop remains
smaller under ﬂexible rates than under ﬁxed rates. Put diﬀerently, the impact of the exchange
rate on the balance sheets under ﬂexible rates is less damaging than the contraction in asset
prices under ﬁxed rates. Our conclusion that a ﬂexible rate regime remains dominant, even
with foreign-indexed debt, is consistent with the conclusions of Cespedes, Chang and Velasco
[14], though the details of the transmission mechanisms under ﬁxed versus ﬂexible rates diﬀer
signiﬁcantly.
5 Concluding Remarks
We developed a small open economy general equilibrium framework that featured money,
nominal price rigidities, and a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. The goal was to explore the
i n t e r a c t i o nb e t w e e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n dﬁnancial crises. As a way to judge the
framework, we explored how well it was able to explain the behavior of the Korean economy
over the 1997-98 period of ﬁnancial crisis. We found that overall the model does well. It is
able to match the observed drop in Korean output, investment, and productivity during this
time period. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism turns out be quantitatively signiﬁcant —
accounting for about 50 percent of the total reduction in output. In addition, the model can
36In the presence of debt denominated in foreign currency, the entrepreneurial net wealth and the external
ﬁnance premium equations are modiﬁed as follows:
Vt =
¡
1+rk
t
¢
Qt−1Kt −
·
(1 + χ(·))
¡
1+i∗
t−1
¢ St
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Pt−1
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¸
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29account for most of the large drop in measured labor productivity by appealing to variable
capital utilization.
Our counterfactual exercises suggested that a policy of ﬁxed exchange rates can lead to
substantially higher welfare losses following a ﬁnancial crisis than would have been obtained
under a policy of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. The ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy was char-
acterized by ﬂoating exchange rates and a well formulated Taylor rule that had the nominal
interest rate adjust to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap. Of course, our counterfactual
experiment assumed that the Taylor rule was fully credible. In practice, however, successful
implementation of a “good” Taylor rule requires that the overall economic infrastructure
must be sound, e.g., the domestic budget cannot be out of control. This kind of considera-
tions, however, poses a dilemma for the successful working of any kind of monetary regime.
Indeed, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [34] note, given that ﬁxed exchange rate regimes never seem
to last, it is not clear that this kind of policy can solve the credibility problem. Nonetheless,
we concede that a better understanding of how credibility considerations factor into the
choice of exchange regimes is an important topic for future research.
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34Appendix
Welfare calculations:
Assuming real money balance eﬀects are negligible, we can write the household’s utility
function at time t as
U
h
t =
£
(Ct)
1−ς (1 − Lt)
ς¤1−σ
1 − σ
.
Since the entrepreneur’s utility function at time t is given by
U
e
t = C
e
t
then in steady state we have
U
h
ss =
£
(Css)
1−ς (1 − Lss)
ς¤1−σ
1 − σ
and
U
e
ss = C
e
ss.
From equation (9), the household’s marginal utility of consumption at time t is given
by
λ
h
t =
∂Uh
t
∂Ct
=( 1− φ)(Ct)
(σ−1)(φ−1)−1 (1 − Lt)
φ(1−σ)
while the entrepreneur’s marginal utility of consumption is 1.
Let the present discounted value of the household’s and entrepreneur’s utility along the
time path be
W
h
t =
k X
t=1
β
t−1U
h
t
and
W
e
t =
k X
t=1
β
t−1U
e
t .
Finally, let the utility of the household and the entrepreneur corresponding to a constant
sequence of consumption and leisure be
W
h
ss =
Uh
ss
¡
1 − β
k¢
1 − β
and
W
e
ss =
Ue
ss
¡
1 − β
k¢
1 − β
.
35Then the welfare cost of the business cycle is given by
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where τ is the household share of total steady state consumption:
τ =
Css
Css + Ce
ss
.
The ﬁnancial contract:
In this section of the appendix, we describe the derivation of the optimal contract in the
non-stochastic steady-state. We then show how to log-linearize the key ﬁnancial equation,
around this steady-state value. Given the solution to the contract, the rest of the model can
be log-linearized in a standard fashion.
Let proﬁts per unit of capital equal ωR
k
where ln(ω) ∼ N(−(1/2)σ2,σ2) so that E(ω)=
1.37 Let N denote the steady-state level of net worth, Q the price of capital (equal to one in
steady-state) and K the steady-state value of the capital stock. The entrepreneur borrows
QK − N to invest K units of capital in a project. The total return on capital is ωR
k
QK
where R
k
denotes the steady-state return on capital. We assume ω i su n k n o w nt ob o t ht h e
entrepreneur and the lender prior to the investment decision. After the investment decision
is made, the lender can only observe ω by paying the monitoring cost µbωR
k
QK, where
0 <µ b < 1. T h er e q u i r e dr e t u r no nl e n d i n ge q u a l sR =1 /β .
The optimal contract speciﬁes a cutoﬀ value ω such that if ω ≥ ω, the borrower pays
the lender the ﬁxed amount ωR
k
QK and keeps the equity (ω − ω)R
k
QK. Alternatively, if
ω < ω, the borrower receives nothing, while the lender monitors the borrower and receives
(1 − µb)ωR
k
QK in residual claims net of monitoring costs. In equilibrium, the lender earns
an expected return equal to the safe rate R implying
µZ ω
0
ωf(ω)dω + ω
Z ∞
ω
f(ω)dω − µb
Z ω
0
ωf(ω)dω
¶
R
k
QK = R(QK − N). (43)
37To be consistent with the notation used in section 3.3.1, we are implicitly deﬁning Rk as
Rk = ωR
k
36The optimal contract maximizes the payoﬀ to the entrepreneur subject to the lender earning
t h er e q u i r e dr a t eo fr e t u r n :
max
K,ω
µZ ∞
ω
ωf(ω)dω
¶
R
k
QK
subject to equation (43).
Given constant returns to scale, the cutoﬀ ω determines the division of expected gross
proﬁts R
k
QK between borrower and lender. We deﬁne Γ(ω) as the expected gross share of
proﬁt sg o i n gt ot h el e n d e r :
Γ(ω) ≡
Z ω
0
ωf(ω)dω + ω
Z ∞
ω
f(ω)dω.
We similarly deﬁne µbG(ω) as the expected monitoring costs:
µbG(ω) ≡ µb
Z ω
0
ωf(ω)dω.
The net share of proﬁt sg o i n gt ot h el e n d e ri sΓ(ω) − µbG(ω),a n dt h es h a r eg o i n gt ot h e
entrepreneur is 1 − Γ(ω), where by construction Γ(ω) satisﬁes 0 ≤ Γ(ω) ≤ 1.
Under the assumption that ln(ω) ∼ N(−(1/2)σ2,σ2) we have
Γ(ω)=Φ(z − σ)+ω[1 − Φ(z)]
and
Γ(ω) − µG(ω)=( 1− µ)Φ(z − σ)+ω[1 − Φ(z)].
where Φ(·) is the c.d.f. of the standard normal and z is related to ω through z ≡ (ln(ω)+
0.5σ2)/σ.
In steady-state, the contracting problem may be written as:
max
K,ω
(1 − Γ(ω))R
k
QK
subject to:
[Γ(ω) − µG(ω)]R
k
QK = R(QK − N).
Let s =R
k
R denote the premium on external funds and k =
QK
N the steady-state ratio of
capital to net worth. The ﬁrst-order conditions for the contracting problem imply that
s(ω) ≡
λ(ω)
Ψ(ω)
(44)
37k(ω) ≡
Ψ(ω)
1 − Γ(ω)
(45)
where
λ(ω)=
Γ0(ω)
Γ0(ω) − µbG0(ω)
.
denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that lenders earn their required rate of
return in expectation and
Ψ(ω)=1− Γ(ω)+λ(ω)[Γ(ω) − µG(ω)].
Equations (44) and (45) provide an implicit relationship between capital expenditures per
unit of net worth k(ω) and the premium on external funds that is the basis for equation (22)
To complete our derivation of the steady-state contract, we need to consider the steady-
state determinants of the return on capital and the net worth accumulation equation. The
steady-state return on capital is determined according to the standard Jorgensonian formula:
1
µ
α
Y
K
= R
k
− (1 − δ). (46)
The steady-state net worth accumulation satisﬁes
N
K
= φ
V
K
+
1
µ
Ω
Y
K
(47)
where
V
K
=( 1− Γ(ω))R
k
(48)
is the return on equity and 1
µΩ Y
K are total managerial labor earnings normalized by the
capital stock. Combining equations (46), (47), and (48), we obtain
R
k
R
−
(1 − δ)
R
=
α
Ω
Ã
1
R
N
K
− φ(1 − Γ(ω))
R
k
R
!
.
Applying equations (44) and (45) we have
s(ω) − (1 − δ)β =
α
Ω
¡
βk(ω)
−1 − φ(1 − Γ(ω))s(ω)
¢
. (49)
Given structural parameters (Ω, α,µ,β,σ,φ,µ b), it is straightforward to solve equation (49)
for the cutoﬀ ω using numerical techniques. Once ω is obtained, we can compute the implied
premium s(ω) and the implied capital-net worth ratio k(ω) using equations (44) and (45).
The the rest of the model’s steady-state can then be computed in a standard fashion.
38In our calibration exercise, we set σ =0 .28,µ b =0 .12,1 − φ =0 .0272,α =0 .5,µ =
1.2,Ω =0 .01. These values imply a 6 percent default rate, a 3.5 percent premium on
external funds, and a ratio for QK/N =2 .1.
Having derived the steady-state of the model, we now consider log-linearizing the key
ﬁnancial equations. For notational ease during our computations, we eliminate the debt
variable from equation (22) by noting that Bt+1/Pt = QtKt+1−Nt+1. Accordingly, equation
(22) can be written in log-linear form as:
Et
©
b r
k
t+1
ª
− b rt = −
1
v
h
b nt+1 −
³
b qt + b kt+1
´i
where
v =
Ψ0(ω)
Ψ(ω)
+
Γ0(ω)
1 − Γ(ω)
is the steady-state elasticity of k with respect to s. This elasticity may be obtained by
diﬀerentiating equations (44) and (45) with respect to ω and evaluating these derivatives at
the steady-state value of ω implied by equation (49).
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FIGURE 2 
 
Call Rates, overnight
(% pa, monthly average)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan-96
May-96
Sep-96
Jan-97
May-97
Sep-97
Jan-98
May-98
Sep-98
Jan-99
May-99
Sep-99
Korean Won to US Dollar
(Monthly average)
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Jan-96
May-96
Sep-96
Jan-97
May-97
Sep-97
Jan-98
May-98
Sep-98
Jan-99
May-99
Sep-99
EMBI Global Korea
(% pa, daily) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
1/01/1996
5/06/1996
9/09/1996
1/13/1997
5/19/1997
9/22/1997
1/26/1998
6/01/1998
10/05/1998
2/08/1999
6/14/1999
10/18/1999
Spread, corporate-treasury bonds 
(% pa, monthly average, 3 yr maturity)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Jan-96
May-96
Sep-96
Jan-97
May-97
Sep-97
Jan-98
May-98
Sep-98
Jan-99
May-99
Sep-99
Korean Stock Exchange: KOSPI 
(monthly, 4/01/1980=100)
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Jan-96
May-96
Sep-96
Jan-97
May-97
Sep-97
Jan-98
May-98
Sep-98
Jan-99
May-99
Sep-99
CPI Inflation
(%, quarterly, o-y-a)
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mar-96
Jun-96
Sep-96
Dec-96
Mar-97
Jun-97
Sep-97
Dec-97
Mar-98
Jun-98
Sep-98
Dec-98
Mar-99
Jun-99
Sep-99
Dec-99
 
 
 
 
 
  42
FIGURE 3 
 
Real Exports
(log, detrended)
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Mar-96
Jul-96
Nov-96
Mar-97
Jul-97
Nov-97
Mar-98
Jul-98
Nov-98
Mar-99
Jul-99
Nov-99
Real Imports
(log, detrended)
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
Mar-96
Jul-96
Nov-96
Mar-97
Jul-97
Nov-97
Mar-98
Jul-98
Nov-98
Mar-99
Jul-99
Nov-99
Net Exports
(% of GDP)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Mar-96
Jul-96
Nov-96
Mar-97
Jul-97
Nov-97
Mar-98
Jul-98
Nov-98
Mar-99
Jul-99
Nov-99
Trade-weighted Real Exchange Rate 
(log, detrended)
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
Mar-96
Jul-96
Nov-96
Mar-97
Jul-97
Nov-97
Mar-98
Jul-98
Nov-98
Mar-99
Jul-99
Nov-99
 
 
  43
FIGURE 4A: COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM SHOCK 
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FIGURE 4B: COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM SHOCK 
 
FIXED VS. FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE (cont’d) 
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FIGURE 5: COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM SHOCK 
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FIGURE 6A 
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FIGURE 6B 
 
KOREAN CRISIS EXPERIMENT (cont’d) 
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FIGURE 7: COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM SHOCK 
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